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RECENT CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DELARATORY JUDGMENTS-Appellees brought ac-

tion under Uniform Judgment Acts, Section 680.1 to 680.15 Burns' Supplement, as taxpayers, against state board of commissioners, city of South
Bend, and the auditor of St. Joseph county. The tax board, on review, had
reduced the levy of the county under the power derived from Chapter 15,
Acts of 1915. The appellees contend that this act is unconstitutional since
the taxing power has been taken away from the municipality and given to
an administrative body with final judgment. The complaint alleged an
actual controversy and asked the court to decide the rights, status and legal
relations between the parties. Appellants contend that the appellees could
not come under the Declaratory Judgments Act unless there was some damage to personal or property rights. The lower court held the statute conferring power on the tax commission unconstitutional. Held: Reversed,
both the tax commission and the Declaratory Judgments Act upheld.
Zoerdfer v. Agler, Supreme Court of Indiana, July 2, 1930, 172 N. E. 186.
Th question of the constitutionality of the Declaratory Judgment's Act
was not entirely settled by the court in the decision. The specific point decided was that a taxpayer could come into court under the statute With a
"public right" and have the legal relations declared, although the petitioner's rights are affected indirectly. But in a dictum, there is strong
support for the legislation if only a "private right" is involved. The statute
seemingly makes no difference in what kind of right is involved for it states,
"Any person . . .whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected
by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise may have determined any question of validity arising under the instrument . . . and

obtain a declaration of rights, status and other legal relations thereunder."
The act further provides that it shall be "liberally construed and administered."
The common objection to this sort of determination of questions has
been that it is not truly a judicial function, but a legislative one. A common definition of legislative power has been the power to lay down the
rules for future conduct, whereas the judicial function is the application of
the law to the facts. Justice Field (in dissenting opinion) in Sinking Fund
Cases, 199 U. S. 727, 25 L. Ed. 504; Smith v. Strother, 68 Cal. 194, 196,
8 Pac. 852, 853; Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S.226. There seems
to be no logical difference between applying the law to the facts in the
future as well as to those in the past. The state courts are under no constitutional limitations as the Federal courts under their interpretation of
"cases and controversies." Article III, Sec. 2, of the Federal Constitution.
As a practical matter, the courts entertain suits constantly which are in
effect nothing more than declarations: (1) Suits to quiet title and remove
clouds on title; (2) Construction of wills, trust instruments and directions
to trustees; (3) Proceedings to register title; (4) Statutes which provide
for determination of heirs without an order of distribution; (5) Stockholders suing corporation to enjoin payment of tax which they believe to be
illegal; (6) Appeal by the State in criminal cases. There are many cases
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too where the declaration of rights are very necessary for the complete
administration of justice: (1) Declaration where there is a present possibility of immediately creating a cause of action and thus avoid formal hostilities; (2) Declaration where one party has a present right for relief,
but the other will suffer prejudice by delay in bringing the action; (3)
Plaintiff has no right of present relief but there is probability that defendant will assert a hostile right; (4) Where the cause of action is in an inchoate state and the rights may be declared before consummation of the
cause of action; (5) No cause for relief but plaintiff's dealings with third
persons depend on the determination of the question between defendant and
himself; (6) No present cause of action has accrued but there is a probability that one will accrue. These instances show the scope of the law if
applied freely by the court as it indicated in its dictum.
In Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n., 48 S. Ct. 507, 510, the Supreme
Court of the United States indicated by a dictum that a declaratory judgment Act would be unconstitutional. That case seemed to follow a rule laid
down in Muskrat v. U. S., 219 U. S. 346, 31 S. Ct. 250. The Indiana case,
however, follows the decided weight of authority in recent State decisions.
State v. Grow, 109 Kan. 619, 201 Pac. 82; Petition of Kariher,284 Pa. 455,
131 Atl. 265; Bramen v. Babcock, 98 Conn. 549, 120 Atl. 150; Blakeslee v.
R. R. D.
Wilson, 190 Cal. 479, 213 Pac. 195.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PoLIcE POWER-Action to enjoin board of park
commissioners from enforcing an ordinance, purporting to have been authorized by Section 1, ch. 32, Acts 1920 (Sp. Sess.), Section 10625, Burns'
1926, regulating and prohibiting billboards located within 500 feet of any
boulevard. Defendant demurred, demurrer was sustained and plaintiff appealed. Held. Reversed, that part of ordinance abating signs that stood
before Sec. 1, Ch. 32, Acts 1920 was passed is unlawful as not providing
compensation as ordered by act but the rest of the ordinance regulating
billboards on aesthetic grounds was legal and the act itself was constitutional. General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Indianapolis, Department of Public Parks, Supreme Court of Indiana, June 27, 1930, 172 N. E.
309.
Ch. 32, Acts 1920, is, as the court remarks, very obscure in meaning. It
contains, first, a provision empowering boards of park commissioners to
condemn land on each side of parks, parkways or boulevards, in order to
establish a building line, between which and the boulevard or park, no
buildings may be erected though owner may otherwise have free use of the
land; and provides for compensation for owners of land so condemned.
Then in the sentence in second line, p. 107, Acts 1920, boards are empowered
in order "to promote public health, safety, morals or general welfare," by
general order to "abate, restrict, forbid or regulate" "offensive or dangerous business or amusement" and to "regulate, restrict and forbid the location of trades, industries commercial enterprises and buildings and devices
designed for uses" which are specified in the order "to be injurious to the
public health, safety, morals or general welfare," within 500 feet of any
such park, parkway or boulevard. Then following on line 17, p. 107, "But
no lawful business being conducted upon such adjacent lands at the time of
acquiring same shall be prohibited or abated without . . . due and full
compensation."

